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1. Introduction
Since 2007, the Dutch public service broadcasting archive Sound and Vision 
(NISV) has successfully digitised large sections of its TV broadcasting material.1 
However, only a very small portion of these is currently accessible online. The 
main stumbling block proved to be the complexity of the copyright environment 
relating to broadcasts. To make a broadcast available online, the permission of the 
right holder under copyright law and related rights is required. However, depend-
ing on the circumstances in which the broadcast was made, each broadcast can 
potentially have a large number of different right holders. In other words, there 
are a number of distinct legal scenarios, each with its own pattern of copyright 
ownership. Up to now, the legal literature has not been able to systematically 
bridge the gap between the theoretical legal options and industry practice. The 
resulting uncertainty about copyright ownership patterns in turn led to a de facto 
freeze on efforts to make materials accessible online. This article demonstrates 
how this gap can be addressed by drawing on methodological developments in the 
social sciences. It shows how it is possible to link distinct legal scenarios to indus-
try practice by using a methodology called process-tracing to examine empirical 
evidence in a systematic manner.
This article demonstrates the potential and practical implementation of pro-
cess-tracing in the legal context, illustrating the discussions with the results of 
a study on copyright ownership in public service broadcasting. The first section 
outlines the kind of circumstances in which a doctrinal analysis by itself is not 
sufficient to address a legal research question. In the second part, process-tracing 
is introduced as a methodology. The section focuses first not only on its core fea-
tures, such as hypothesising causal effects and the weighting of evidence, but also 
the requirements that have to be met to transpose the methodology to another 
discipline. The second part then points out how process-tracing can be used in 
legal research. In doing so, it will address each core requirement identified in 
* Ph.D., University of Plymouth, United Kingdom and Institute for Information Law, Amster-
dam, The Netherlands.
1 For a summary of the project, see Beelden voor de Toekomst, www.beeldenvoordetoekomst.nl 
(last accessed 2 June 2017).
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section two and illustrate the discussion using the example of copyright own-
ership in the broadcasting sector. The final part then shows the added value of 
process-tracing in answering legal research questions.
2. The Conundrum of Copyright Ownership: When a Doctrinal Analysis Is 
Not Enough
Establishing who owns the copyright looks at first sight like a purely legal ques-
tion that can be answered using a doctrinal analysis. Hutchinson captures the 
main aim of doctrinal research very succinctly: ‘The essential features of doctri-
nal scholarship involve “a critical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation 
and case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the matter under investi-
gation”‘ (Hutchinson, 2015, p. 131). In other words, doctrinal research at its core 
seeks to clarify how a situation would be resolved by a legal rule, depending on 
the reasoning established by the legislation and case law. However, a doctrinal 
analysis is essentially forward-looking. When the legal reasoning as well as the 
context is known, the specific, context-dependent outcome can be deduced. The 
relevant context is often not known or at least not known for certain. This gap can 
be highly significant in practice, as the following example on copyright ownership 
in the broadcasting sector shows.
To make broadcasts accessible online, the user needs to license the making avail-
able right from the right holder.2 The starting point for all doctrinal analyses of 
copyright ownership is the creator doctrine. It states that when a work is made 
and no special circumstances apply, the rights are owned by the author (creator).3 
TV broadcasts in turn are made up of many distinct copyright works and related 
subject matter, each with their own right holder.4 Following this reasoning, many 
individuals and companies should own the rights. However, the empirical evi-
dence5 available for a subset of TV broadcasts showed that, in fact, the rights are 
highly concentrated in very few hands: namely the broadcaster, an independent 
producer or shared between the two. 
2 Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society (Directive 2001/29/EC) (Information Society Directive), Arts. 2 and 4. 
Please note that none of the exemptions listed in the Directive permit the digitisation projects 
to make the items available online.
3 Information Society Directive, Art. 2 and Art. 3. In the Netherlands, see Art. 1 Auteurswet (Aw).
4 If a work is made by more than one creator, then these authors share the copyright. As a result, 
the number of right holders is even larger.
5 The empirical evidence is drawn from the Schoon Schip dataset, which is explained in more 
detail below.
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Decade








1950s 0 5 180 185
1960s 2 20 1111 1133
1970s 8 41 783 832
1980s 7 217 910 1134
1990s 76 893 1993 2962
2000s 48 1223 2283 3554
Table 1. The types of right holders listed in the Schoon Schip dataset
The findings indicate that some kind of causal mechanism has to be in effect that 
creates these high levels of rights concentration. Indeed, there are three causal 
mechanisms that facilitate the concentration of rights into fewer hands, which 
can be grouped into two broad scenarios. First, there are special situations in 
which not the creator but a third party is deemed the author, called deviations 
from the creator doctrine.6 There are two of these mechanisms in the Nether-
lands: a third party can own the rights in the work if they were made under 
employment,7 or first communicated to the public by a legal entity without nam-
ing the author.8 Each one of these is a distinct causal mechanism, although the 
final outcome is the same. In the second scenario, the rights are transferred by 
contract.9 Here, the third party owns the rights because the original creator has 
transferred them to it. Most notably, both scenarios have the same observable 
outcome: the rights are concentrated in very few hands. However, it is not known 
which of the two accounts for the outcome because the context for the doctrinal 
analysis is missing: relevant information on industry practices and contracts are 
not known. Nonetheless, identifying the reasoning is of crucial importance for 
the research question, who owns the making available right?
The difference between the rights concentration based on a deviation from the 
creator doctrine and transfers are numerous, but, most importantly for the issue 
discussed here, they differ on their treatment of unknown uses. The right to con-
trol online use of a protected work (the making available right) is comparatively 
new. If the third party right holder acquired the rights by law (presumed to be the 
initial author under the deviations to the creator doctrine), then unknown uses 
6 It should be noted that deviations from the creator doctrine mechanisms apply only if there is 
no additional contractual relationship to the contrary (‘tenzij tusschen partijen anders is over-
eengekomen’ in both Art. 7 Aw and Art. 8 Aw). For example, an agreement between an employer 
and an employee on copyright ownership in addition to the general employment contract would 
negate the applicability of Art. 7 Aw. In these cases, ownership is determined by the instrument 
of transfer (e.g. the additional contract) and therefore the third causal mechanism mentioned 
here. See also footnotes 10 and 19.
7 Art. 7 Aw.
8 Art. 8 Aw.
9 Especially Art. 2 Aw, Art. 45(a)-(g) Aw and Art. 3 WNR, Art. 4 WNR, Art. 9 WNR Art. 35(3) 
WNR.
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at the time of creation are also included. The third party right holder will there-
fore be able to license online use. However, if the rights were contractually trans-
ferred to the third party, then this is significantly less likely. Contracts in the 
Netherlands have to be interpreted narrowly, meaning that uses unknown at the 
time of the transfer, like online use, are not automatically included in a transfer.10 
These broadcasts are therefore more complex to license for online use because a 
broader range of authors and other stakeholders have to give permission, raising 
the transaction costs. This shows that the question of how the rights were con-
centrated is actually of vital importance to the user seeking to license online use.
In summary, there are two distinct explanations for the observable rights concen-
tration, but it is not clear from the doctrinal analysis alone how the observable 
outcome has come about. As a result, it is also not clear who owns the making 
available right at the centre of this study. In other words, the research question 
cannot be answered using only a doctrinal approach. Instead, the comparative 
influence of the two explanatory mechanisms on industry practice needs to be 
assessed. The conceptual problem of having multiple, plausible explanations for 
the same outcome is not new and has been subject to significant methodological 
advances in the social sciences, most notably in the form of process-tracing as a 
methodology.
3. Process-Tracing
3.1 Process-Tracing as a Methodology
Process-tracing is an intra-case methodology developed in the social sciences to 
test competing causal theories.11 While it has many uses, the focus of this article 
is on its potential to evaluate a number of competing explanations against empir-
ical evidence (Collier, 2011, p. 824). Process-tracing presumes that a causal mech-
anism leaves distinct observable traces in those it affects even when the final 
outcome is the same. This means that it is possible to determine whether a mech-
anism is relevant by comparing the empirical evidence against the hypothesised 
empirical traces. Consider the following example: a puddle of water on the floor. 
There are two possible scenarios or causal mechanisms that can explain the pud-
dle. The first one is that someone dropped a bottle of water, causing the content to 
spill. The second one is that it has rained, creating the puddle. By understanding 
how the mechanism works, it is possible to deduce which particular observable 
traces it is likely to leave. For example, if our puddle was caused by rain, then the 
pavement around the puddle should also be wet. Creating these kinds of testa-
ble hypotheses for all mechanisms under investigation permits the researcher to 
10 For a systematic discussion, see for example Seignette, 2012, Lenselink, 2012 and Hugenholtz 
& Guibault, 2004. 
11 For general introductory texts, see for example Bennett & Elman, 2006, Collier, 2011, Checkel, 
2005, Mahoney, 2012 and Mayntz, 2004. 
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systematically assess which of the two explanations is more likely to explain a 
particular outcome, here the water puddle.
The added value of process-tracing is its coherent conceptualisation of what empir-
ical findings imply for the hypothesis under examination as well as for any alter-
native explanations.12 Rather than treating all empirical examinations as equal, 
process-tracing includes a clear understanding of the comparative weight of the 
evidence. This means that process-tracing aims to both confirm an explanatory 
mechanism as the most likely one while at the same time eliminating alterna-
tive ones.13 To clarify the discussion, this section again relies on the water puddle 
example outlined above.
In general, process-tracing distinguishes four different types of empirical tests.14 
The weakest test is the ‘straw in the wind test’. This test is the most general, focus-
ing on the plausibility of a hypothesis as a whole. A straw in the wind test could, 
for example, be the number of people around our puddle. A spilled drink is more 
likely if there are more people around. A passed test increases the likelihood, but 
it is by no means a confirmation. More formally speaking, this type of test affirms 
a hypothesis, that is, it is does not contradict it. However, the explanatory value 
is limited because the examined conditions are neither necessary for the expla-
nation to apply nor sufficient on their own. Spilling a drink is not directly related 
to the number of people: one person is enough. In addition, a straw in the wind 
test does not eliminate a rival hypothesis. After all, the presence of people has no 
effect on the alternative explanation that it has rained. It can rain with many or 
few people around. 
Type of Test
Straw in the 





Effect of passed 
test on hypothesis Affirmation Affirmation Confirmation Confirmation
Effect of failed 
test on hypothesis Weakened Elimination Weakened Elimination
Effect of passed 








Effect of failed 









Table 2. Summary of the process-tracing tests for causal inference (Based 
on Collier, 2011, p. 825)
12 In the literature, this is not always explicitly expressed. See for example Mahoney, 2012 on 
sufficient conditions and Collier, 2011 for an overview.
13 The same logic is very familiar from detective stories such as Sherlock Holmes where all possible 
explanations are eliminated one by one until only one remains.
14 The classification was developed by Collier, 2011. The analysis of conditions is based on 
Mahoney, 2012.
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A stronger test is the ‘hoop test’ because of its importance for the tested explan-
atory mechanism. These tests examine necessary conditions that have to be met 
for an explanation to be deemed relevant. In other words, if this kind of evidence 
cannot be found, then the mechanism is ruled out. For example, if the explana-
tion rain is examined, a possible hoop test is the actual location of the puddle. 
It does not rain inside of buildings; therefore, the puddle necessarily has to be 
outside. If this is not the case, the rain-hypothesis fails the hoop test and is elim-
inated in practice. It should be noted, however, that a passed test only affirms a 
hypothesis but does not confirm it. It is not evidence that the hypothesis is cor-
rect, but only that it is not necessarily wrong. In line with this, the effect on the 
rival hypothesis is limited.
In comparison, the ‘smoking gun test’ is stronger because its explanatory value 
for the hypothesis under examination is more pronounced. A smoking gun here is 
a particular empirical trace that is strongly aligned with one explanatory mecha-
nism but not consistent with the alternative ones. In our example an empty water 
bottle with a missing cap right next to the puddle would be such a smoking gun. 
It strengthens the explanation that the puddle was caused by a spill rather than 
rain by providing evidence for the required means: the tool. More formally speak-
ing, it provides a sufficient condition. At the same time, if the smoking gun is not 
present, it weakens the mechanism but again does not rule it out. The absence 
of a water bottle does not necessarily mean that no one spilled their drink: they 
may have just picked it up after the event. The condition is therefore not a neces-
sary one. However, the effect of a smoking gun test on alternative explanations 
is weaker. The presence of a water bottle again does not prevent rain, and there-
fore does not actually rule rain out as an explanation for the puddle. On balance, 
therefore, a smoking gun test confirms a hypotheses because the event is so spe-
cific. At the same time, it only weakens alternative explanations but does not 
eliminate them.
The strongest and most decisive test is the ‘double decisive test’. Here, several 
observable characteristics are combined into one test based on the assumption 
that if all of the evidence is present at the same time, then the test is harder to 
pass. For example, if the puddle is inside, there are many people around, and there 
is an open, empty water bottle next to the puddle, then the combination of factors 
confirms the spilled-drink explanation and eliminates rain as an explanation. 
Viewed from the angle of the spilled-drink hypothesis, the location of the puddle 
and the presence of people are by themselves only straw in the wind tests, while 
the open water bottle is a smoking gun test. However, viewed from the angle of 
the alternative rain explanation, the location of the puddle inside a building is a 
failed hoop test and therefore an absence of a necessary condition. The puddle has 
to be outside for rain to be relevant. The test therefore combines both sufficient 
and necessary conditions, depending on the hypothesis examined. It is the com-
bination of tests all pointing in the same direction that confirms one explanation 
while eliminating the alternative one.
In summary, process-tracing is a methodology that allows the researcher to 
assess how a particular outcome has most likely come about when more than one 
explanation (causal mechanism) is plausible. To use process-tracing effectively, 
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a number of requirements have to be met. First, there have to be several explana-
tory mechanisms that are understood well enough to determine which observable 
traces they leave and how the patterns are between the mechanisms. Secondly, 
the relevant empirical evidence needs to be available for examination. Thirdly, the 
individual empirical tests have to be conceptualised in terms of their evidentiary 
strength, namely as straw in the wind, hoop, smoking gun and double decisive 
tests.
3.2 Process-Tracing in Law
This section will show why and how process-tracing can be used in addition to a 
legal analysis. In particular, it will address each of the process-tracing require-
ments and emphasise how these work in the context of a doctrinal analysis. In 
addition, the theory will be illustrated using the specific example of copyright 
ownership in the broadcasting sector: Article 7 Aw is one of the two causal mech-
anisms15 in the copyright act that fall under the deviation from the creator doc-
trine as described above.16
3.2.1 Observable Traces: Law Shapes Behaviour
The previous discussion has shown that process-tracing is based on the assump-
tion that a causal mechanism leaves empirically observable traces. The effects 
of laws are based on the same assumption: people are expected to adapt their 
behaviour in response to changes in the law, although not always in the way or 
to the extent the authorities planned. For example, universities prohibit plagia-
rism and enforce it via their own policies that all students have to subscribe to. 
In this context, increasing the punishment for plagiarism is intended to ensure 
students do not plagiarise. They are expected to do so, for example, by not copying 
directly from a source without quotation marks and by spending more effort on 
their referencing skills. However, this only works if the students are aware of the 
policy in the first place. This awareness can be problematic if the analysed group 
of actors and their role is not shaped by the law directly. In copyright, this may be 
the case when works are not made with a commercial motive, for example when 
the authors do this work as a hobby rather than for a living. However, this is not 
case in the scenario examined here: public service broadcasting, like broadcast-
ing more broadly, is done by professionals. Changes to the law strongly influence 
what the individual gets paid for and how much. An awareness of the law is there-
fore essential for their livelihood. Laws and rules can therefore be understood as 
causal mechanisms in the context of process-tracing when those affected by it can 
be reasonably expected to be aware of them.
15 The other one is Art. 8 Aw (first communication by a public entity).
16 Overall, the study underlying this article examined three mechanisms: employment (Art. 7 Aw 
and related ones), first communication by a public entity (Art. 8 Aw and related ones) and trans-
fers (Art. 2 Aw and Art. 45a-45g and related ones). However, for reasons of clarity, the section 
will rely only on an extract from the Art. 7 Aw analysis. A full discussion of all mechanisms by 
article can be found in Anonymous, 2017.
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A detailed doctrinal analysis can provide the necessary theoretical understand-
ing required to identify the characteristics and effects of a legal mechanism. In 
methodological terms, the actor-centred presumption means that the law has to 
be understood from the point of view of those it affects at the time in question. As 
a result, a historical method has to be used for the doctrinal analysis. In addition, 
the explanatory mechanisms can be best distinguished by paying special atten-
tion to changes in the law. These turning points are least likely to be identical 
across the different mechanisms, therefore providing patterns that are relevant 
for one mechanism but not the others.
To illustrate what this means in practice, consider Table 2. It is an extract from 
the employment provisions in the Dutch Copyright Act (Art. 7 Aw) between 1912 
and 1988.17 Under this article, the employer is the author of the work if the work is 
made in the course of employment and no other arrangement has been agreed.18 
In other words, rather than the numerous individuals that have actually created a 
work, Article 7 Aw declares the employer as the sole author. This reduces the num-
ber of right holders, leading to a concentration of rights. In the study used here 
as an example, the law was analysed chronologically, relying on the statute, case 
law and commentaries from the time period examined rather than modern ones.
From 1912 1951 1973–1988
Legal 
provision 
In the course of employment, unless agreed otherwise
Inter­
pretation
Relationship of authority: employer defines the tasks
Salary/compensation
All works covered by employment
Explicit employment contract Implicit Scope of Employment (Sense of Duty)
Scholarly 
debate
Moral rights assumed owned by employer Ownership of moral rights 
debated: tendency towards author 
ownership
Contracts to the contrary not discussed Contracts to the contrary are 
increasingly relevant, including 
implicit ones
Table 3. Employment rules for copyright works 1912–1988, drawn from 
report
The field ‘legal provision’ focuses on Article 7 Aw itself, and it is clear that this 
article has not been amended. The practical interpretation of the article by case 
law is given in the part ‘Interpretation’. It shows that employment is determined 
by a combination of factors, including whether the employer had the authority to 
17 Anonymous, pp. 51-61, which discusses the employment mechanism for the time frame 1912–
2017. 
18 Conceptually, this assignment of a third person (here the employer) as the author is an example 
of the deviation from the creator doctrine, as discussed in The Conundrum of Copyright Own-
ership: when a doctrinal analysis is not.
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assign and define tasks to the employee; remuneration of some kind; as well as 
whether creating the type of work in question was within the remit of the employ-
ment contract.19 These have remained stable. However, the last requirement, 
the scope of employment, was reinterpreted in the case law to be more employ-
er-friendly. Until 1951, the term had been understood as reading the contract at 
face value. After 1951, the contract is read in context: an activity would now also 
be included if the employee had felt a sense of duty to carry out the work, even if 
it was not formally part of his usual tasks.20 In other words, temporary changes to 
the employee’s duties are now covered.21
While the case law favoured the employers, the scholarly debate started to focus 
on the limits of an employment contract. Before 1973, the ‘contracts to the con-
trary’ played de facto no role in the scholarly debate.22 However, the scholarly 
opinion clearly changed by 1973. By that time, legal scholars laboured extensively 
on when a contract to the contrary exists and when it does not. In particular, 
based on case law, they argued that naming an author by itself can undermine 
Article 7 Aw and should be prevented unless the applicability of Article 7 Aw has 
been explicitly safeguarded (Gerbrandy, 1988, p. 53). Based on this deep under-
standing of how the mechanism works across time from the point of view of those 
affected by it, it is possible to generate the hypotheses necessary for empirical 
testing.
3.2.2 Available Empirical Evidence
The doctrinal analysis can guide the empirical analysis by providing the basis for 
generating hypotheses. However, process-tracing can be used only if empirical 
evidence is available against which the hypotheses can be tested. In principle, 
empirical evidence can come from two sources. First, if the resources allow, empir-
ical evidence can be collected according to the factors indicated by the doctrinal 
analysis as important. In the case of copyright law, this could, for example, be sur-
veys of broadcasters on their rights arrangements or interviews with key stake-
holders. The second, and more likely, source of empirical evidence is data that has 
already been collected. While this kind of information is not collected with the 
specific research question(s) in mind, this does not mean that it cannot be used. 
The researcher needs to have a clear understanding of how the data was collected, 
methodological decisions and issues. In other words, the researcher needs to fully 
understand what the data shows and, equally important, what it does not show.
In the study used as an example here two datasets were available. The first one 
consisted of the full NISV public service broadcasting archive’s meta-data, cover-
ing the whole population of public service TV broadcasts that the research sought 
19 For a more detailed contemporary discussion, see for example Gerbrandy, 1988, p. 52ff.
20 HR 19 Jan 1951, N.J. 1952, 37 (Van der Laan/Schoonderbeck).
21 Rechtbank Haarlem, 9 oktober 1987, uitspraak nr 355, AMI 1988 Nr. 3, p. 64.
22 See for example, De Beaufort, 1942 or Wink, 1952 in comparison with Pfeffer & Gerbrandy, 
1973 and Wink, 1975.
Schroff.indd   9 27/09/2018   12:30:04
This article from Law and Method is published by Boom juridisch and made available to anonieme bezoeker
Simone Schroff
10 Law and Method
to analyse.23 The data included information on the type of broadcast, the broad-
caster, the year as well as other copyright-relevant information such as the name 
of the producer, composers, text writers and other contributors who have played 
a copyright-relevant role. The second dataset explicitly focused on the ownership 
of exclusive rights in TV broadcasts. The data was collected as part of the Schoon 
Schip project by examining the TV production archives of several broadcast-
ers.24 The information covered related to the broadcaster, other contract parties 
involved and the ownership of the specific exclusive rights, including the dura-
tion, territory and purpose. To summarise, the following specific indicators were 
available to the researcher and could therefore be used to analyse the relevance of 
specific copyright ownership mechanisms. 
Schoon Schip Catalogue Meta­Data
Data level: one case = one season Data Level: one case = one individual item
Type of Broadcast: radio or TV
Year of the Broadcast
Name of the Broadcaster(s)
Presence of a Contract NPO classification of the broadcast
Right Holders Type of contributor role filled at season level
Role of the Right Holder Type of contributor role filled at item level
Division of rights
– Economic rights
– Purpose of use
– Jurisdiction
– Term of assignment
Digital Status
Table 4. The available indicators, based on the Schoon Schip and Catalogue 
meta-data datasets
The two datasets determine what kind of information is available. For each causal 
mechanism under investigation, the doctrinal analysis has to be translated into 
expectations (or hypotheses as they are named here) that rely on these availa-
ble indicators. In other words, it has to be clearly stated what kinds of empirical 
traces a causal mechanism would leave in the available data. How the translation 
process works in practice can be best explained by using an example. The follow-
ing section will show how the doctrinal findings summarised in Table 2 have been 
combined with the available indicators presented in Table 3.25
23 The data was extracted by NISV for the purpose of this research according to the requirements 
of the researcher.
24 The Schoon Schip project aimed to get an insight into who owns the rights in broadcasting 
material. The information was collected by researchers who went to the broadcasters’ produc-
tion archives and analysed the rights ownership information following a standardised pattern. 
The coding manual and explanatory texts were made available to the author.
25 This presents an extract. A full conceptualisation of employment as a mechanism for pro-
cess-tracing can be found in Anonymous, 2017.
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As outlined above, Article 7 Aw states that the employer is the author of a work 
if the work was made under employment. The catalogue dataset in turn records 
copyright-relevant roles, for example the scriptwriter, etc. However, since the 
employer, and not the individual, is the author, it is a disincentive to record them 
as such:
E1:26 Since the employer is the maker, the catalogue data is unlikely to list 
individuals in the author functions. Instead, they will be left empty since the 
individuals are not authors in the sense of the copyright law.
In addition, we have seen that the status of the author has increased over time, 
most notably around 1973. It is in the interest of the employer to prevent this:
E8: Permitting the author to put his name on a work can indicate an implicit 
contract, acting as a disincentive to the naming of authors (especially after 
1973). Works of employment are therefore more likely to not have any author 
information.
The second set of hypotheses relates to who the employer is and how he will pro-
ceed to guarantee his rights. The basis for Article 7 Aw is the employment contract 
stating the duties of the employee. Indeed, relying on a separate contract can con-
stitute ‘a contract to the contrary’ threatening the article taking effect. Therefore, 
there is a strong disincentive to have separate production contracts in addition to 
their lack of legal necessity.
E2: The basis for rights ownership is the employment contract. A separate 
production contract is not required and may indeed constitute an ‘agreement 
to the contrary’, threatening the employer’s ownership of rights.
In addition, the industry examined here is public service broadcasting. This refers 
to an industry where making a broadcast requires resources such as professional 
equipment, studios, etc. In other words, the threshold to enter the market is high:
26 The hypotheses are labelled according to the type of mechanism (E = Employment). The num-
bering is not in order because this example is an extract from a larger, more comprehensive 
doctrinal analysis. To ensure the clarity of the discussion for the purpose of this article, the 
individual characteristics are not in the same order as in the original research. As a result, the 
numbering of the hypotheses is not consecutive in this section. However, it was decided not 
to renumber the hypotheses for reasons of structure as well as consistency with the original 
research. 
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E3: Due to the financial resources required, the author will most likely be a 
legal entity. This will most likely be a single entity.27
Finally, if Article 7 applies, then the employer is the author and therefore holds 
all of the rights. It is not a partial assignment. Nonetheless, the rights are trans-
ferable. This is important because of the technological restriction of broadcasting: 
the signal only reaches a certain territory. This means that while the employer 
benefits from owning all of the rights for the territory where his viewers are, 
there is little added benefit beyond. To maximise the broadcast’s economic value, 
it is possible that the broadcaster would assign the rights for other territories 
to third parties while maintaining control for his own jurisdiction. The Schoon 
Schip dataset does provide these kinds of insights.
E4: The legal entity as the author will own all economic rights.
E5: The legal entity as the author will own the rights at least for its broadcast-
ing area, meaning the Netherlands.
E6: The legal entity as the author will own the economic rights for all pur-
poses.
E7: The legal entity as the author will own the economic rights for the full 
term of protection.
At this stage now, the legal analysis has given rise to testable hypotheses. How-
ever, not all hypotheses are equal in practice because the evidentiary strength of 
the data can vary.
3.2.3 The Strength of Empirical Tests in Law
In order to interpret the empirical tests coherently, each hypothesis has to be clas-
sified by the type of test: straw in the wind, smoking gun, hoop or double decisive. 
As already outlined, these tests vary in strength in terms of both the hypothesis 
tested and alternative mechanisms. In the legal context, special attention at this 
stage has to be paid to the likelihood that a change in the law affects behaviour. 
This strongly depends on the area of law under investigation and the relationship 
between the law and the actors. In principle, the strongest influence has the legis-
lation itself, followed by case law. These changes shape the substantive law as well 
as its interpretation directly. They are therefore more likely to lead to adaptations. 
In comparison, the scholarly debate is likely to have a weaker influence but, espe-
27 It is unlikely that a person is employed by two companies at the same time; therefore, employ-
ment rules under Art. 7 Aw are favouring ownership by a single entity.
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cially in a professional setting such as public service broadcasting, should not be 
ignored. The lawyers involved in drawing up contracts in this professional setting 
are specialists and as a result aware of debates. If the scholarly debates moved 
in a way unfavourable to them, they are more likely to take precautions against 
its negative effects. However, the scholarly debate does not change the substan-
tive law by itself, and therefore an absence of observable patterns here affects the 
validity of a hypothesis less than if a theorised effect from a court case or even 
change to the legal provision is not observable. Therefore, legal debates translate 
into weaker tests than changes in the statute or case law.
In addition, the strength of the test is also influenced by the available empiri-
cal evidence, in particular its weaknesses in the specific context of the research 
questions.28 For example, the catalogue meta-dataset had a few broadcasts for 
which the broadcasting year was obviously incorrect, e.g. before 1951, when pub-
lic service broadcasting first appeared in the Netherlands. Since it is not possi-
ble to identify the actual year, all of these had to be reclassified as broadcasting 
year unknown. While care and manual correction of data entries were carried 
out to clean up the catalogue data, like nearly all meta-data, there remains a risk 
that some entries do contain errors. In the actual analysis, it was therefore nec-
essary to actively account for known issues and resolve them as far as possible. 
The Schoon Schip dataset also had its weaknesses. For example, it does not cover 
all of the public service broadcasters. It is therefore not possible to draw a repre-
sentative, random sample for analysis. Having said this, the dataset does include 
large and smaller broadcasters, meeting the standards for purposive sampling.29 
This means that any findings from this data have to be seen as trends, although 
as strongly indicative ones.
The more general result of the dataset weaknesses is that the scope of available 
tests is narrowed under the process-tracing theory. In particular, no individ-
ual test can be conclusive. Instead, the analytical value is limited to affirming 
or weakening a hypothesis. It cannot be used to confirm or eliminate them. In 
this sense, it is the accumulation of evidence that matters most. If the empirical 
evidence follows a hypothesis, it lends some credence to this explanatory mecha-
nism being correct. If it does not, then the explanation is weakened. However, it 
is the combination of tests that indicates which scenario is more likely in compar-
ison with the other.30
Since none of the tests are conclusive by themselves, the relative strength of the 
different explanatory mechanisms needs to be coherently assessed. In addition 
to the number of failed, inconclusive or passed tests, a weighting was applied. 
The weighting scores are determined by the strength of the test, based on their 
relationship to necessary and sufficient conditions, as explained earlier, as well 
28 For a more detailed discussion, see Anonymous, 2017.
29 See for example, Bryman, 2015, Feinstein, 2002 and Lawless, Robbenholt & Ulen, 2016.
30 In other words: the methodology indicates how likely or unlikely a scenario is by filling in the 
context required to assess the relevance of mechanisms. It does not allow for a definite con-
clusion on which specific mechanism has caused the rights concentration for a particular TV 
broadcast.
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as the type of evidence available (and its weaknesses). For the copyright owner-
ship study, the baseline test is the straw test with the score 1 because it does not 
examine either necessary or sufficient conditions, making it the weakest. This is 
followed by the smoking gun test, which evaluates sufficient but not necessary 
conditions. It was weighted as a 1.5. The tests examining necessary conditions are 
valued higher because they set a minimum requirement. As a result, the hoop test 
is deemed more important than a smoking gun test with a score of 2, while the 
combined tests are seen as the strongest. It is given a score of 3. In addition, when 
a test was determined as borderline but not actually neutral, 0.5 is subtracted 
from the standard test value. For example, a weakly passed straw test is awarded 
a 0.5 rather than 1.
In relation to the employment hypotheses discussed earlier, the following evi-
dence is available. 










p E3: Due to the financial 
resources required, the author 
will most likely be a legal entity. 
This will most likely be a single 
entity.
Schoon Schip: Ownership by Legal 
Entity
Hoop
Schoon Schip: Single right holder Straw








E2: The basis for rights 
ownership is the employment 
contract. A separate production 
contract is not required and may 
indeed constitute an ‘agreement 
to the contrary’, threatening the 
employer’s ownership of rights.
Schoon Schip: Contract present Straw
E9: Relying on employment 
contracts has been increasingly 
risky since 1988. This increases 
the likelihood that additional 
contracts are made to underpin 
major investments and ensure 
copyright ownership, such as 
expensive film productions. 












E4: The legal entity as the 
author will own all economic 
rights.
Schoon Schip: Average number 
of rights
Straw
Schoon Schip: Distinct Number 
of Rights
Straw
Schoon Schip: Type of right Straw
E5: The legal entity as the 
author will own the rights at 
least for its broadcasting area, 
meaning the Netherlands.
Schoon Schip: Number of distinct 
jurisdictions
Straw
Schoon Schip: Identity of 
jurisdictions
Hoop
E6: The legal entity as the 
author will own the economic 
rights for all purposes.
Schoon Schip: Purpose of uses Straw
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E7: The legal entity as the 
author will own the economic 
rights for the full term of 
protection.
Schoon Schip: Duration Straw
E11: The legal entity as the right 
author will own all economic 
rights, for all purposes, for the 
full term of protection, for the 
Dutch territory.



















E1: Since the employer is the 
maker, the catalogue data is 
unlikely to list individuals in 
the author functions. Instead, 
they will be left empty since the 
individuals are not authors in 
the sense of the copyright law.
Catalogue Data: No contributor 
information
Straw
Catalogue Data: Broadcast 
without author
Straw
Catalogue Data: Author 
categories
Straw
E8: Permitting the author to put 
his name on a work can indicate 
an implicit contract, acting as 
a disincentive to the naming of 
authors (especially after 1973). 
Works of employment are 
therefore more likely to not 
have any author information.
Catalogue Data: Author 
categories (specified drop)
Smoking Gun
E10: By 1988, successful works 
can give rise to a right to receive 
additional remuneration to the 
main authors. An increasing 
number of key contributor 
categories should therefore 
be used. In the context of film 
works, this will be in particular 
the director.
Catalogue Data: Importance 
director
Smoking Gun
Table 5. Summary hypotheses for the employment (Art. 7 Aw) with indica-
tor and type of test
4. Demonstrating the Potential of Process-Tracing in Practice: Findings 
from the [Anonymous] Project31
This section presents the overall results of the analysis carried out in the [Anony-
mous] project, showing the added value of process-tracing in practice. As mentioned 
earlier, the analysis focused on how the rights in TV broadcasts are concentrated. 
It distinguishes between deviations to the creator doctrine under Articles 7 and 8 
Aw, and transfer-based mechanisms.
31 The detailed results, including all hypotheses, tests and results, are available from the author. 
This also includes the relevant original datasets, coded datasets as well as the coding schedule.
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The results clearly show that the rights concentration observable for the whole 
time frame is actually the result of different mechanisms. The following table 




1950s 25% 79% 79%
1960s 25% 97% 97%
1970s -10% 97% 98%
1980s 39% 71% 78%
1990s 38% 21% 26%
2000s 72% 8% 13%
Table 6. Comparison of the three mechanisms based on the weighted pro-
cess-tracing score as a share of the maximum possible score.
Most notably, the analysis identified the 1960s and 1970s as the most likely dec-
ades to be shaped by deviations from the creator doctrine via either the employ-
ment provision or the first communication to the public by a public entity. Both 
mechanisms score 97% or higher for the two decades:32 none of the empirical tests 
contradict the hypotheses, although one is a weak pass. At the same time, the 
evidence in favour of transfer-based explanations is very weak, even reaching the 
negative score of –10% in the 1970s.33 More notably, 2 out of 4 tests are actually 
failed before 1970 and 4 out of 9 for the 1970s. Hence, it is reasonable to con-
clude that deviations from the creator doctrine, and not transfers, account for the 
rights concentration before 1980.
The importance of transfer-based mechanisms increases after 1980, reaching 
dominance by the 1990s. On the one hand, the scores are falling for both employ-
ment and the communication- based explanations. While none of the hypotheses 
are contradicted for the 1980s, two tests are indeed inconclusive. The comparative 
score drops to 78% and 71%, respectively.34 The trend is even stronger for the 
1990s and 2000s, when the score falls to only 5 out of 19 (1990s) and 2.5 out of 
19 (2000s). By 1990, the two mechanisms are de facto irrelevant: 26% and 21% 
(1990s) and only 8% and 13% after 2000. The results for the transfer-based mech-
anism are the opposite. The comparative score increases from -10% in the 1970s 
to 39% in the 1980s. Not only is this a significant increase of 49% overall, but the 
trend is continuing thereafter. By 1990, the mechanism is superseding the alter-
natives with 38% and 72% in the 2000s.35 Therefore, while the deviations from 
32 Employment: 18.5 out of 19 (1960s) and 20 out of 20.5 (1970s); Communication to the public by 
a legal entity: 18.5 out of 19 (1960s and 1970s).
33 1.5 out of 6 (1950s, 1960s), -1 out of 10 (1970s).
34 Employment: 16 out of 20.5, mainly because the strong double decisive test for the rights con-
centration is inconclusive. Communication: 14.5 out of 20.5.
35 4 out of 10.5 and 6.5 out of 9.
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the creator doctrine-based mechanisms lost importance from 1980 onwards, the 











1950s 15 19.0 14 1  
1960s 18.5 19.0 15   
1970s 20 20.5 16   
1980s 16 20.5 14 2  
1990s 5 19.0 9 3 3
2000s 2.5 19.0 9 5 1
8 Aw
1950s 15 19 14 1  
1960s 18.5 19 15   
1970s 18.5 19 15   
1980s 14.5 20.5 13 3  
1990s 4 19 8 4 3
2000s 1.5 19 8 2 5
Transfer
1950s 1.5 6 4  2
1960s 1.5 6 4  2
1970s -1 10 5  4
1980s 4.5 11.5 6 2 1
1990s 4 10.5 6 3 1
2000s 6.5 9 7  1
Table 7. Summary of the weighted process-tracing scores for the employ-
ment-based mechanism (Art. 7 Aw), communication to the public 
by a public entity (Art. 8 Aw) and transfer-based mechanisms
These findings on the comparative strength of explanatory mechanisms have 
practical implications for the research question: who owns the making available 
right. First, the making available right is likely to be owned by the same party 
that holds all of the other rights until 1980. Secondly, the legal rules applying 
to transfer-based mechanism should be used for broadcasts made in 1980 or 
thereafter. Here the specific production date matters in the context of the mak-
ing available right. The internet was unknown, or at least not considered com-
mercially relevant, until at least the early 1990s. The making available right is 
therefore unlikely to be covered by standard copyright transfer contracts. Once 
the potential of the internet was recognised, contracts are more likely to cover it. 
In terms of licensing the making available right, these results mean that older TV 
broadcasts have the least transaction costs because of the smaller number of rel-
evant right holders. This is followed by new ones from the era when the internet 
was a commercial factor. However, TV broadcasts subject to copyright transfers 
and made in the 1980s or early 1990s are likely to have incomplete contractual 
coverage, with the original authors owning the making available rights. These 
therefore also have the highest transaction costs in the context of licensing them 
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for online use. A doctrinal analysis alone would have not been able to provide 
these insights.
5. Conclusion
A significant proportion of legal research focuses on the effect of laws. In this con-
text, doctrinal research combines the legal reasoning established in the statute 
and case law with a specific context to draw conclusions on the overall outcome. 
As long as both the legal reasoning and the context are known, doctrinal research 
provides invaluable insights and is sufficient to answer the relevant research ques-
tions. However, there are areas where the context is vague or missing entirely, 
while the observable outcome can be explained by more than one distinct legal 
scenario. This poses major challenges for the researcher because while the over-
all outcome may be the same, the differences in legal reasoning can have major 
repercussions on other aspects. For example, as the illustrating examples relied 
on in this article show, a particular exclusive right that was unknown at the time 
of creation (here the making available right) can be owned by another party than 
all other rights. The repercussions for licensing works in the online environment 
cannot be overstated.
In these cases, doctrinal research by itself is insufficient. One possible solution is 
offered by using process-tracing to identify the missing context. By focusing not 
only on the observable final outcome but also on other empirical traces the indi-
vidual legal mechanisms are likely to leave and how these differ from each other, 
process-tracing can provide information on the relevant context, which is crucial 
for a doctrinal analysis. As this article has demonstrated, a detailed understand-
ing of the legal mechanisms as well as the available empirical evidence, can pro-
vide insights into which scenario was in comparison more likely when. By doing 
so, the findings based on process-tracing can strengthen the doctrinal analysis by 
providing more certainty about which legal mechanism explains the overall out-
come and for what time frame. In this article, the most likely owner of the making 
available right became clearer, facilitating the licensing process as a result.
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